The President and the Public

Former President Richard Nixon’s (1913–1994) management style differed from Lyndon Johnson’s (1908–1973) in that Lyndon Johnson catered to the existing establishment, whereas Nixon appealed to popular national objectives. Similarly, both appeased to the majority of constituents with moderacy, and both expanded the White House staff considerably. Nixon lost the presidential election to Kennedy in 1960, redeeming his position as president eight years later in 1968. Both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon’s victories were contingent on their adversaries, whom harnessed beliefs on necessary reformations that ought to occur in government.

Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson’s managerial actions as president displayed a persistent belief that the expansion of government through the use of executive powers—independent of Congress—would gain them an advantage. Instead, it severely impacted their popularity; and historically tarnished their political legacy.

Presidential powers were exploited by delegation during each administration with worsening severity; to the extent that “[b]y the end of Nixon’s first term there were visible signs that the White House was amassing tremendous power,” (Hogue, A., p. 76). Specifically, “the EOP [Executive Office of the President] staff had doubled from 292 under Johnson in 1968 to 583 by 1972,” (Hogue, A., p. 76). The unfavorable expansion of the executive office and White House Staff culminated a reservoir of influence from within the jurisdiction of the executive branch; seeping into the court of public opinion.

Campaign Staffing

The two presidents, Johnson and Nixon, initially faced similar circumstances in their political opposition during their presidential campaigns. Lyndon Johnson and Nixon were seen as political moderates alongside their fringe opposing parties, Barry Goldwater (1909–1998) and George McGovern (1922–2012). Lyndon Johnson (LBJ) sought to maintain America’s course with its institutionalist agenda; whereby Barry Goldwater strove to annihilate it. Goldwater thus divided the Republican party between Establishment Rockefellers and independent-minded conservatives; weakening the Republican vote, thereby highlighting criticism on both sides of the political Establishment. Johnson’s campaign staff thereby attacked Goldwater’s position, depicting his views as outlandish.

In response, LBJ’s campaign weaponized the mainstream media with misinformation against Goldwater’s “radical” positions, highlighting his unwillingness to vote for further government regulations—the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and by claiming he would remove Social Security. But “Johnson placed himself in the middle of the political spectrum and won a resounding victory in 1964, becoming president in his own right (61.0 percent to 38.5 percent).” (Pfiffner, J., 2-2a). Thus, Lyndon Johnson was elected; riding on the coattails of the Kennedy Administration, and the institutional objectives of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Nixon’s political opposition George McGovern was “more liberal on economic and social issues than most voters,” leading to Nixon’s election. While “Goldwater and McGovern were able to activate and energize the ‘true believers’ on their respective ends of the political spectrum to capture the nomination of their parties;” the strict views of Goldwater and McGovern did not persuade the majority of constituents, (Pfiffner, J., 2-2a). Operating the same spirit of popular neutrality, Richard Nixon won by a landslide “in the 1972 election (60.7 percent to 37.5 percent),” (Pfiffner, J., 2-2a).

White House Staffing

Lyndon Johnson differed from Nixon by his initial White House staffing; in that he did not appoint new members for his Administration; instead he relied on the Kennedy Administration largely due to his premature entry into presidency. When Johnson “assumed office in 1963 after President Kennedy's assassination, he asked the existing Cabinet to stay in order to ensure a smooth transition,” (Bilbray).

Lyndon Johnson’s personal associate James Blundell (1926–2016) remarked that “some members of the Kennedy staff felt that Johnson wasn’t as refined as Kennedy and maybe they shouldn’t appear together,” (Pietrusza, D., p. 410). Thus, Johnson did not have the full support of the White House staff during his initial incumbency. When Lyndon Johnson won the 1964 Presidential Election he utilized his presidential power in the executive branch to breach through the wall of separation—forging an outlet for public influence: Lyndon Johnson was the first president to have a pollster on the White House staff, (Pfiffner, J., 2-3b). Similarly, “President Nixon assigned one staffer to work on polling,” (Pfiffner, J., 1-3).

Richard Nixon’s management style differed from Lyndon Johnson in his views on war, the domestic economy, and foreign policy. While “Johnson misled the country and secretly escalated the war in Vietnam in 1965;” Nixon wanted to end the Vietnam War, (Pfiffner, J, 1-3; NixonFoundation). Nixon differed from Johnson in his ability to perceive “the implications of the changing nature of governing” stating that “[t]he staff [didn’t] understand that we [were] in a continuous campaign,” (Pfiffner, J., 2-3b). Unlike Johnson’s reliance on the Democrat party for his candidacy; “Richard Nixon raised most of his own money rather than depend on the Republican Party for fund-raising,” (Pfiffner, J., 2-3b). Further, “[i]n the 1968 and 1972 campaigns, he emphasized his own qualifications for office rather than his party allegiance.” (Pfiffner, J., 2-3b). Thus, Nixon enhanced his public appeal by rooting his allegiance in populism, rather than pandering to the Leviathan. “Nixon emphasized the experience in foreign affairs he had gained in the Eisenhower administration, and Kennedy promised to ‘get the country moving again’ after what Democrats considered the complacency of the Eisenhower years.” (Pfiffner, J., 2-2a).

Relative Effectiveness

The Relative effectiveness of each were displayed in the campaign staffing to highlight their moderacy as “[m]ost voters are not firmly committed to one end of the political spectrum,” (Pfiffner, J., 2-2a). Moreover, “many more voters turn out to vote in the general election than in primary elections,” (Pfiffner, J., 2-2a). As James Pfiffner theorizes “if the winners of nominations do not move quickly toward the middle of the political spectrum, they will likely lose the election,” (Pfiffner, J., 2-2a).

In office, Nixon was “fiscally conservative” at a time the majority of Americans wanted to end the Vietnam War, and bring the troops home. During his incumbency, Nixon “would send Congress a budget, which would pass appropriations acts in response,” (Congress). But “[t]he process was dominated by powerful committee chairmen appropriations;” its payments were often “late,” and its “supplemental spending bills were passed ad hoc,” (Congress). After Johnson was elected, his excessive use of presidential powers combined with his escalation of the Vietnam War sank his approval ratings. Alas, “presidential approval ratings . . . [are] likely to decline during the first term,” (Pfiffner, J., 2-3b).

Biblically, both presidents were relatively ineffective insofar as the New Testament’s depiction of government obligation. As it is written, “[F]irst of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all people, for kings and all who are in high positions, that we may lead a peaceful and quiet life, godly and dignified in every way,” (1 Timothy 2:1-2; ESV). Nixon’s management style White House did not produce godly nor dignified behavior; nor did the managerial actions of Lyndon Johnson.

Thus, both Presidents were ineffective in their duty to God. As indicated by the Apostle Paul in the New Testament, “[c]onsequently, whoever rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves,” (Romans 13:2; NIV). Therefore, both Nixon and Johnson defied the order of God by weaponizing government and expanding their staffing to the limits of the authorities.

Conclusion

In sum, both the Nixon and Johnson presidencies embraced the culture of executive expansion; exploiting the presidential powers enacted by our Founding Fathers. The actions of Johnson and Nixon’s administration had a profound effect on White House staffing, and the expansion and autonomy of the executive branch. While Nixon was elected under populist promises, he strived to maintain America’s institutional directive; relying on the bolstering of executive branch agencies—including J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI. Conclusively, Nixon and Johnson’s management of executive staff were marked by their unpopular expansion of government; thereby normalizing the creation of government to remedy previous iterations of unchecked bureaucracy.

Bibliography

Congress. (Accessed on January 26^th, 2025). 116^th Congress Politico: So . . . this is Nixon’s fault? https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110331/documents/HMKP-116-JU00-20191211-SD118.pdf

ESV. 1 Timothy 2:1-2

Hogue, A. (2012). Stumping God: Reagan, Carter, and the Invention of a Political Faith (Studies in Rhetoric & Religion Book 13). Baylor University Press.

LBJlibrary. (Accessed on January 22^nd, 2025). The Cabinet. LBJ Library. https://www.lbjlibrary.org/life-and-legacy/lbjs-administration/cabinet

NixonFoundation. (Accessed on January 22^nd, 2025). Facts About Richard Nixon: 37 Facts About America's 37th President. https://www.nixonfoundation.org/37-facts-richard-nixon/

NIV. Romans 13:2

Pietrusza, D. (2008). 1960: LBJ vs. JFK vs. Nixon: The Epic Campaign that Forged Three Presidencies. Diversion Books. Kindle Edition.