The Discipline of Political Science
Political science remains central to the assurance of a functional polity. This report seeks to shed light on three major criticisms of political science as a discipline;
First
Robert D. Putnam highlights a first point of disagreement among scholars, presented by Charles Beard (1874–1948); indicating that a persistent bias has ensued within the field of Political Science; its criticism being that political scientists focus on studies that cater to the interests of the powerful—in hopes of gaining recognition and marking their place in history among the most distinguished political theorists. He notes Charles Beard’s words, that "[i]f the student of politics prescribes a remedy that pleases [some powerful group], he will probably be hailed as a scientist; if his suggestion is unpalatable, he is only a professor after all." Thus, Gabriel Almond (1911–2002) provides empirical data to support Beard’s theory that political science is split as a field between ideological and methodological; producing two separate fields with four quadrans. Almond believes that on the soft left is meta-methodological “[p]olitical science can only be science then, if it is fully committed to the attainment of socialism,” whereas the hard right is skeptical of institutionalism and bureaucracy, (Almond, G., pp. 830-832). Almond expounds, that the remaining two quadrants are the ideologically driven hard left and the methodologically conservative soft right; whereby diluting the potency of the field of political science to aspire to one that fits an agenda.
Almond’s entire argument is infected with bias; namely dicto simpliciter (sweeping generalizations), emotional appeal (sacrificing facts to exalt opines), and bifurcation (false dichotomy—explicitly stating that “[i]t is not correct to argue that political science deviated from classical political philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and that it has been on the wrong path ever since. Nor is it correct to attribute to American political science the effort to separate political theory from political action. The Straussians cannot legitimately claim exclusive origin in classical Greek philosophy. The scientific impulse in political studies had its beginnings among the classical Greek philosophers. Robert Dahl, for my money, is a more legitimate follower of Aristotle than is Leo Strauss,” (Almond, G., p. 836).
Putnam offers a solution to Beard’s problem citing his metaphor that; “political science doesn't really solve public problems, but we can ‘shed light’ on them. And we have a professional obligation to do so.” Putnam contends that instead of disputing the effectiveness of political science, one should recognize that; “the United States has a degree of power in the world today that is probably historically unprecedented, a dominion that exceeds that of Great Britain at its peak and perhaps Rome at its peak;” Putnam states we should ask instead “How should we use this moment?,” (Putnam, R., p. 252). It remains the object of the political scientist to present solutions to persistent problems encountered throughout history; with application to modern affairs; thus perpetuating society and man. Therefore, powerful groups with interest in gaining public recognition may employ political scientists to recognize and address problems, whilst obtaining viable solutions. Putnam concludes that “political science is neither a wise counselor whispering truth to power nor a distanced gadfly,” but instead should feature a “a political scientist engaged in genuine dialogue with our fellow citizens, learning as well as teaching [solutions to problems].”
Second
The second point that is often argued is, and presented by Gabriel A. Almond is that “political science is not only amoral, it is not really productive of knowledge,” (Almond, G., 834). Strauss simultaneously remarks on criticism of the stagnation to the advancement in the field of Political Science. Almond quotes Strauss out of context writing; "[g]enerally speaking, one may wonder whether the new political science has brought to light anything of political importance which intelligent political practitioners with a deep knowledge of history, nay intelligent and educated journalists, to say nothing of the old political scientists, did not know at least as well beforehand," (Strauss, L.; Almond, G., p. 834). Strauss answered his own question, namely in his commentary, whereby writing “[t]he higher way of life is not sustained by an enduring, intelligible order, and its future depends on the noble benevolence of the creative spirits. As the best in the human depends on will, the philosopher has the sacred obligation to secure the future of the best,” (Strauss, L., Loc. 209). Leo Strauss believed correctly that philosophy was directly correlative to political theory; yet beyond criticism encountered in the field of political science, critics accuse Straussians of subjugating historic laws under the authority of natural right. Not only is the field of political science itself criticized; but its approach, methodology, and variance in theory are highly scrutinized.
Leo Strauss offered a proposed solution to this problem, writing; "[m]oral obtuseness is the necessary condition for scientific analysis. The more serious we are as social scientists the more completely we develop within ourselves a state of indifference to any goal, or to aimlessness and drifting, a state of what may be called nihilism," (Strauss, L.; Almond, G., p. 834). A further proposed solution to this problem is the direct implementation of political theory into new fields within contemporary polity. With newly forming fields such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and transhumanism, political theorists must implement their knowledge of history and political philosophy to perpetuate polity for posterity. Leo Strauss horrifyingly reveals in his lectures at Chicago University that “[i]n present day positivism, science is silent about all moral questions,” (YouTube).
Third
Political philosopher Kristen Monroe presents a third position of common disputation found in Almond’s article; naming a “methodological separateness that limits us as a discipline;” that political science contains no core; it lacks a centralized focus, (Monroe, K., p. 36, 37).
Monroe offers her own solutions to the problem, citing an apparent “common intellectual vitality” her own beliefs—that there exists a core at the center of the field of political science; and that its potential absence matters. Monroe considers the central core of political science to be implicit; something known, recognized, and responsive; a guiding light to pursue, (Monroe, K., p. 34). Explicitly, Monroe asserts that her view transitioned from the purpose of the discipline of political science to be power and influence; yet after learning from David Easton (1917–2014), Monroe now adds its core contains “a consideration of the allocation of authoritative values.” Monroe points to a third solution, given to her by Joseph Cropsey (1919–2012); that is the proper and actual relationship of the individual to the society they live, (Monroe, K., p. 34). The object of political science is to unveil truth; its central core. To say that no centralized core exists refutes the entire purpose of political science. The subject itself is a unified endeavor that strives to correct disbalances and grievances proposed by the public.
Biblically Paul reminds us of the importance of focusing on our weaknesses. Paul’s methodology translates to the discipline of political science, whereby no matter the criticism against the political scientist, truth can be found. As it is written, “[s]o to keep me from becoming conceited because of the surpassing greatness of the revelations, a thorn was given me in the flesh, a messenger of Satan to harass me, to keep me from becoming conceited. Three times I pleaded with the Lord about this, that it should leave me. But he said to me, “’My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in weakness.’ Therefore I will boast all the more gladly of my weaknesses, so that the power of Christ may rest upon me. For the sake of Christ, then, I am content with weaknesses, insults, hardships, persecutions, and calamities. For when I am weak, then I am strong,” (2 Corinthians 12:7-10; ESV).
The discipline of political science may seem futile, displaced, ambiguous, or even biased; yet at further glance, there exists an inherent truth that is recognized among both parties, and that is the betterment of society. Public policy and political science must strive to make the world a better place, not the inverse. As it is written “[f]or the moment all discipline seems painful rather than pleasant, but later it yields the peaceful fruit of righteousness to those who have been trained by it,” (Hebrews 12:11; ESV).
Conclusion
The context of political science as a discipline continues to be a matter of debate, yet it continues to lack an explicit consensus on the best method of governance among conflicting ideologies. Yet beyond the issues of conflict, there remains a unified purpose found in political science that cannot be debated among critical scholars. That is, that it remains a relevant and pertinent practice in the position of politics thereby facilitating a state of continuous advancement in the field of politics, this allows various conflicting ideologies to collectively work on the centralized core whereby the subtle differences matter far less than the principle.
Bibliography
Rousseau, J. The Essential Rousseau: Translated by Lowell Bair
Liberty University. GOVT210(B01) - Political Science as a Discipline (Kindle Locations 168-170). Kindle Edition.
Strauss, Leo. Leo Strauss on Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra (The Leo Strauss Transcript Series) . The University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition.