Specialty Courts
Specialty Courts exist to offer convicted criminals greater flexibility in sentencing, modernizing the criminal justice system. The term “Specialty Courts” is used to describe Courts “conceptualized as either/or options (e.g., probation or prison, jail or bail, guilty or innocent),” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 98). These Specialty Courts include “gun courts, drug courts, community-based courts, teen courts, mental health courts, domestic violence courts, and even reentry drug courts,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 99). Benekos and Merlo write that “this gives judges more control over cases, a wider array of dispositional options, and a model to use the court’s authority in monitoring, supervising, and sanctioning offenders,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 99).
The word Determinism is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “a philosophy that human behavior is governed primarily by preexisting conditions . . . and is not influenced by will,” (Garner, B, p. 564). The word Indeterminate is defined as “[n]ot definite, distinct, or precise; impossible to know about definitely or exactly,” (Garner, B., p. 921). The word Final is described as “not requiring any further judicial action beyond supervising how the decree is carried out,” (Garner, B., p. 773). Specialty Courts possess various interventions that allow for indeterminate sentencing; contingent on the behavior and compliance of the participant. Interestingly, Bouvier Law Dictionary defines the word Determinability as “[a]ble to be destroyed,” adding “[w]hat may come to an end by the happening of a contingency,” Sheppard, S., pp. 816, 817). Bouvier Law defines the term Legal Indeterminacy as [l]ack of specific legal rules that allows judges or officials to act from personal whim, (Sheppard, S., p. 1293). Bouvier Law Dictionary adds that H.L.A. Hart (1907–1992) “argues that some measure of indeterminacy is essential to law but that the discretion of officials in its use is bounded, (Sheppard, S., p. 1293).
The term Indeterminate Sentencing is defined to be [t]he practice of not imposing a definite term of confinement, but instead prescribing a range for the minimum and maximum term, leaving the precise term to be fixed in some other way, usu. Based on the prisoner’s conductand apparent rehabilitation while incarcerated, (Garner, B., p. 921). Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines Indeterminate Sentencing as “[a] prison sentence that is for no less than a minimum period and no more than a maximum period, its exact duration to be determined by the prison or parole authorities based upon behavior in prison or similar considerations, (Handler, J., p. 251).
Many aspects of specialty courts remain contingent on the participants willingness to adhere to the conditions. These courts can issue various rulings from determinate to indeterminate sentencing; in addition to partially indeterminate combinations. As Peter J. Benekos and Alida V. Merlo notes, “[i]ndeterminate, partially indeterminate, and determinate sentences are the basic components of state and federal sentencing statutes,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 74). Of these compenents the American Criminal Justice has moved from determinate sentencing to indeterminate sentencing.
Benekos and Merlo note that determinate sentencing utilizes “a fixed period of time that the offender would serve in prison,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 74). But indeterminate sentencing, features a “model, [where] the judge would impose a minimum sentence and a maximum sentence, but the actual time served was determined by someone other than a member or representative of the judiciary. Typically, [this] was the parole authority,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 73). It’s worth noting that in partially indeterminate sentencing “the decision to release the offender from prison was typically made by the state parole authority (U.S. Department of Justice, 1988:91),” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 73). Ballentine’s Law Dicitionary defines the term Determinate Sentecing as “[a] sentence whose duration is set by statute and cannot be reduced by a parole board based ipon apparent rehabilitation, behavior in prison, or other considerations. A sentence whose duration is set by statute and can be modified by the sentencing judge only in very special circumstances, (Handler, J., p. 139).
Weight of Court Sentencing
A closer look at the differences in the sentencing of specialty courts display observable benefits and detriments, that must be considered within each. No matter the form of sentencing, thoughtful consideration must be applied to ensure the participant arrives at a state of reformation on their own accord. As Christian Apologist and instructor at Liberty University Mark Foreman (1954–2022) wrote “we hold people responsible for the choices they make. The idea of punishing people for crimes they have committed—at least in any punitive way—presumes that they were able to not commit them, (Foreman, M., pp. 108, 109).
Scripture reminds the contemporary policymaker in crafting this initiative, “[b]ondservants, obey your earthly masters with fear and trembling, with a sincere heart, as you would Christ, not by the way of eye-service, as people-pleasers, but as bondservants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart, rendering service with a good will as to the Lord and not to man, knowing that whatever good anyone does, this he will receive back from the Lord, whether he is a bondservant or is free,” Ephesians 6:5-8 (ESV). The Apostle Paul adds a message relevant to the contemporary courts; scribing “Masters, do the same to them, and stop your threatening, knowing that he who is both their Master and yours is in heaven, and that there is no partiality with him,” Ephesians 6:9 (ESV).
Determinative. With determinate sentencing, “[t]he offender was required to serve his or her entire sentence, less any good-time credits that were awarded. Advocates contended that determinate sentences could physically restrain offenders from participating in crime while simultaneously preventing them from future criminal tendencies,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 74). A benefit was that determinate sentencing was “believed to be less partial (thus, not influenced by who the offender was) and more likely to prevent further crime,” (Merlo & Harris, p. 74). Moreover, “[d]eterminate sentences effectively ended parole discretion,” (Merlo & Harris, p. 74).
Indeterminate. With indeterminate sentencing, “Indeterminate sentences faced criticism from both liberals and conservatives beginning in the 1970s,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 73). Benekos notes that critics of indeterminate sentence differed in their contentions; in that “[l]iberals were convinced that the rights of offenders were being violated and that offenders were being treated differently depending on the judge handling the case (Goodstein & Hepburn, 1985:15);” whereas “[c]onservatives criticized the lack of rehabilitation occurring in prisons and lobbied for tougher sentences and less judicial discretion (Goodstein & Hepburn, 1985:15; Wilson, 1975, cited in Tonry & Hamilton, 1995:3),” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 73). As Political Theorist Phyllis Schlafly (1924–2016), recounting her front-line experience in politics since the election of 1964, wrote in 2014, “[a]sking judges to decide the best interest is causing more and more mischief, (Schlafly, P., Loc. 87). Court sentencing has become a science in contemporary polity.
Political Theorist Alex Jones of Infowars.com adds that “[t]he question is whether our science can be questioned by the justice system, or whether unchecked science will be allowed to obtain ultimate control over our society,” (Jones, A., p. 403). While indeterminate sentencing may seem appealing, it gives the Courts the power to reimagine justice in their own image. Determinate sentencing is more impartial in that it applies a standard to criminal sentencing; but conversely it can unjustly punish criminals, leading to the introduction to further criminality. Indeterminate sentencing is itself a science that ought to be formulated in a determinate manner, thus offering some form of predictability and long-term consistency.
Three Specialty Courts
Benekos notes that “[n]ationally, it was Barry Goldwater who first promoted the theme of “law and order.” In an attempt to portray Johnson’s “war on poverty” as a softheaded response to crime and disorder, Goldwater succeeded in placing the country’s focus on crime, (Benekos & Merlo, p. 115). As Barry Goldwater wrote, “Russell Kirk’s The Conservative Mind, published the year I entered the Senate, was also important to me. Kirk gave the conservative viewpoint an intellectual foundation and respectability it had not attained in modern society. He assailed the planning mentality of the times. Kirk rightly said it undermined the role of the family and community. He declared that religion, family, and private property and its yield, as well as law and order, were the foundations of a conservative society, (Goldwater, B., p. 2137).
In your heart you know he’s right. Expanding Goldwater’s concept, these specialty courts can examine their methodology in achieving their outcome objectives in three specific areas: (1) Mental Health Courts, (2) Gun Courts, and (3) Drug Courts. By securing the process objectives of each of these three specialty courts crime can be dramatically reduced, starting from within the participant, rather than being externally imposed.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term court rules as “[r]egulations having the force of law and governing practice and procedure in the various courts,” (Garner, B., 457).
Mental Health Courts
The Indeterminate Sentencing Model includes “federal funds for jail diversion, treatment for offenders in prison with mental illnesses, community reentry assistance, and training programs,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 100). While the observable benefit is that many convicts can be reformed by this implementation; it remains contingent on the “voluntary participation of [the] offenders,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 100).
Determinate Sentencing Models include a “‘three strikes and you’re out’ sentencing system,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 100). Critics believe this to not only be ineffective, but unjustly expensive in the long-term for taxpayers.
Benekos recorded in 2006 that Bush ratified the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act into law in October of 2004, a bill that aimed to “provide federal funds for jail diversion, treatment for offenders in prison with mental illnesses, community reentry assistance, and training programs,” (Benekos & Harris, p. 100). Critics believed that the initial first years are “too soon to know how effective this legislation will be in providing for the delivery of treatment to juvenile and adult offenders,” asserting that it only “appears to recognize the immediacy of the problem,” (Benekos & Harris, p. 100). One solution to this problem is to incorporate a combination of factors; not rely on one exclusive solution.
Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting, wrote that “[t]he term ‘idiot’ was generally used to describe persons who had a total lack of reason or understanding, or an inability to distinguish between good and evil…due to their incompetence, idiots were excuse[d] from the guilt, and of course from the punishment…[while] Mentally retarded offenders with less severe impairments—those who were not “idiots”—suffered criminal prosecution and punishment, including capital punishment…[t]he Court is left to argue, therefore, that the execution of the mildly retarded is inconsistent with the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’ (Scalia, A., p. 152). Scalia’s dissent reveals the delicacy of determining an individual’s fate based on their mental capacity or level of cognitive awareness. As Ruth Bader Ginsburg (RBG) delivered in the Supreme Court ruling for Olmstead v. L.C. (1999), writing that “[u]njustified placement or retention of persons in institutions severely limits their exposure to the outside community, and therefore constitutes a form of discrimination based on disability prohibited by Title II…Undue institutionalization qualifies as discrimination ‘by reason of … disability…The ADA both requires all public entities to refrain from discrimination, see §12132, and specifically identifies unjustified “segregation” of persons with disabilities as a “for[m] of discrimination,” see §§12101(a)(2), 12101(a)(5), (LII),. These positions should be greatly considered when formulating indeterminate sentencing for mentally disabled individuals. God decrees in the Old Testament that “‘Do not curse the deaf or put a stumbling block in front of the blind, but fear your God. I am the LORD,’” (Leviticus 19:14; NIV). Man ought to ascribe to this position when considering the implementation of a determinative law on a mentally disabled individual, rather than opting for alternative treatment to incarceration (ATI).
Gun Courts
Determinate sentencing models include California’s January 1998 “strict mandatory sentencing model to felonies committed with guns.” Benekos and Merlo write that, “[t]he law requires an additional 10 years in prison for carrying a gun while committing a serious violent felony,” 20 years if the gun is fired, and an additional 25 years to life ‘if a shooting results in a serious injury to a victim’” (Criminal Justice Newsletter, 1997b:1), (Benekos & Merlo, p. 114). Benekos adds that this initiative, “[r]eferred to as the “10-20-LIFE” penalties, this legislation indicates that get-tough policies show no sign of waning in California, (Benekos & Merlo, p. 114). Therefore, “[i]n some states, such as Washington, a third conviction for specified offenses can result in life imprisonment without possibility of parole,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 113).
This was not always the case; “[b]eginning in the 1990s, policymakers applied a baseball metaphor to correctional policy,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 113). Yet new revision must occur, as noted by the statistics; Benekos writes, "[e]ach year, the annual average increase has been 3.5 percent. The rate of incarceration in June of 2004 was 486 inmates for every 100,000 residents of the United States, (Benekos & Merlo, p. 112).
One solution proposed in the 1990s was the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. This act authorized the Department of Justice (DOJ) to “‘award’ grants to those states that enacted truth-in-sentencing legislation,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 115). A further solution, Benekos notes that “[s]ome states have responded to juvenile gun violence by enacting and strengthening legislation that restricts youths’ access to firearms,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 175).
Contemporary critics against early release programs believe that “we are too soft on criminals, and that offenders are released from prison after serving only a small part of their sentences,” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 115). A modern remedy thus must consider the totality of (1) granting early release; with that of (2) mandatory determinate sentencing; and (3) its effects on society. On deterrence, Benekos notes, in “[a] recent study by Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieraitis (2004) found that there is no statistical evidence that three-strikes legislation reduces crime either through deterrence or the incapacitation of repeat offenders (2004:234),” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 114).
Drug Courts
Benekos notes there exist over 1,600 drug courts in America; “[t]he largest percentage of parole releases from prison continues to be drug offenders, Benekos & Merlo, p. 101). Benekos adds that “[a] National Institute of Justice study compared the rearrest data from a sample of 17,000 offenders who had successfully participated in drug court programs versus those who had been imprisoned for drug offenses. The findings indicate that 16.4 percent of the drug court graduates versus 43.5 percent of the prison releases were rearrested and charged with a serious offense in the first year after completion of the sentence, and these differences persisted in the second year (27.5% rearrested compared to 58.6% rearrested after prison) (Roman, Townsend & Bhati, 2003:2; Walters, 2005:31),” (Benekos, & Merlo; pp. 99, 100).
Historically determinate sentencing has resulted in higher taxes and mass incarceration for non-violent crimes. Incarceration does not help drug abusers, but instead redirects their behavior to seek drugs within the prison system. Moreover, the taxpayer is expected to fund the operation.
But an Indeterminate Sentencing Model, Benekos and Merlo note that “[s]pecial pre-release treatment programs and follow-up are essential to facilitate the reintegration and successful reentry of these offenders into the community (Hughes, Wilson & Beck, 2002),” (Benekos & Merlo, p. 101). The downside to this approach is that many drug abusers can deceive the system, and return to their ways following the completion of this program. In other words, the program’s context matters. The intervention must work to reform the individual, starting from within, rather than imposing external conditioning that requires a temporal adaption.
One benefit of using an indeterminate sentencing model in specialty drug courts is that California, and Pennsylvania already have functional systems that can be studied and duplicated. California’s “Proposition 36 provides for the diversion of low-level drug offenders into treatment programs. In 2004, [whilst] the Pennsylvania legislature enacted Title 37, (Benekos and Merlo, p. 101). Critically, a detriment includes its “alternative to the conservative, get-tough policies that focus on punishment, incapacitation, and deterrence,” again relying on the personal compliance of the participant,” (Benekos and Merlo, p. 102).
Faith Based Intervention
Faith based intervention, though often overlooked, is essential to reduction in criminality. As Chris Marshall writes “[p]unishments are often prescribed for particular offenses in biblical legislation. But punishment is a means to an end, not an end in itself . . . For many crimes, the typical penalty was restitution to the victim plus compensation,” (Marshall, C., p. 45). This includes the redaction of criminal thoughts and criminal actions, as Christianity continuously places the participant’s actions before God; while offering repentance. It remains far easier to omit personal morals and self-disciple; than it is to reject divine provision and create distance from God. Once a relationship with the Lord has been actualized; a person is less likely to engage in conduct that would impede clarity of His guidance.
Byron Johnson notes that “faith-motivated volunteers and organizations must also be open to the notion that objective research is something they should consider if for no other reason than it is an act of stewardship. Research like this will make it possible to improve programs in order to achieve better and more effective outcomes,” (Johnson, B., p. 74). But theory ought not supplant action. These notions, objective research, and the process objectives must each be steward to formulate actionable steps that can produce an evident and progressive change for the betterment of the participants within this program. As historian David Barton believes, “today, the fundamental power given to juries is not only regularly disregarded but is also frequently disdained by many judges,” (Barton, D., Loc. 965).
God remains with us throughout our trials and tribulations; but it remains our decision to partner with Him. There exists no standard. God accepts everyone from monks to murderers. James reminds us that no man is perfect. We all battle demons in different ways. But by faith we will prevail. James scribed, “[f]or we all stumble in many ways.” James 3:2a (NASB). Further, James asks, “[w]ho among you is wise and understanding? Let him show by his good behavior his deeds in the gentleness of wisdom. But if you have bitter jealousy and selfish ambition in your heart, do not be arrogant and so lie against the truth. This wisdom is not that which comes down from above, but is earthly, natural, demonic, (James 3:13-15; NASB).
Leaders, ought to be moral examples for their constituency; if not in their private lives, at least in their voting history. William F. Buckley, Jr. wrote that, “[l]et those leaders, instead of berating the police, encourage the police to apprehend, and isolate, the criminals in their midst, and, simultaneously, let them urge those who will listen to them, that the surest way to avoid embarrassing confrontations with the policeman, is to obey zealously the laws that are written to protect everyone in New York, black or white, rich or poor, young or old,” (Buckley, W., pp. 192, 193). Buckley expounds, warning that “[t]he pressure to encumber the police comes primarily from members of that minority group affecting to speak for the whole of it, who for political reasons have gotten endorsements from men whose private judgment probably opposes the suggested civilian review board, (Buckley, W., p. 191).
God reserves the power to change people’s lives. Brian Welch, guitarist of the popular band KoRn, was radically delivered by God, leading him to reform his life in the image of Christ, and reconsider many previous positions he held. In Welch’s book, Save Me From Myself: How I Found God, Quit Korn, Kicked Drugs, and Lived to Tell My Story, he described his experiences as a missionary in India. During Welch’s mission, he encountered an Indian population that had resorted to cannibalism, or raiding the local orphanages for food; as a result of government neglect. Brian Welsh prayed with the locals, and his missionary group was able to assist in bringing vital resources back into the community. Welsh attested that “in the time since we met the Loadi tribe, crime has dropped 90 percent, and today the orphanage is up and running in the Loadi village,” (Welch, B., p. 184). If a formerly secular metal musician can be radically reformed, and driven by God into one of the most poor regions of the planet, American criminality can be dramatically reduced utilizing these same measures. His actions reveal that the naturally depraved tendencies and external demonic influences that exist within human nature can be regulated through revelation. If the Loadi tribe can reform the community from cannibalism to Christ, so can the American justice system utilize faith-based reformation to bring restoration to inmates within all stages of the criminal justice system.
Conclusion
The role of specialty courts are conducive to action. But this action must be taken to ensure there exists viable indeterminate sentencing. The courts needn’t acquiesce to laxity, and ought to observe foreseeable action steps that have, intend, and are currently producing a benevolent change in the contemporary system of Criminal Justice. A faith-based intervention can utilize existing working blueprints to reformulate their strategic effort to reform convicted criminals. Determinate sentencing stands as a point of historic reference; and can assist in the participant’s willingness to commit themselves to the process, as many instances of indeterminate sentencing in specialty courts are voluntary in that it remains contingent on compliance.
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