Presidential USFP Speeches
From James Monroe to Donald Trump, it’s clear that the executive branch’s framework to national foreign policy has taken drastic—often inverted—contortions of its original executive, and America’s first president, George Washington. From concurrent stewardship to blatant self-interest, America’s executive has exhibited radically different apporaches of the Constitutional role of commander in chief. Concerning Foreign Policy, three distinct positions held by any U.S. president: (1) similarity—an originalist position of non-interventionism first formed by Washington; (2) differences—necessary ad hoc deviations; and (3) inconsistencies—a complete diversion from any recognizable tradition.
Yet, all three aspects of presidential declamation employ the element of diplomacy. Black’s Law defines the word Diplomacy as “[t]he art and practice of conducting negotiations between national governments,” (Garner, B., p. 574). Similarly, Rhetoric is defined as “[t]he art of speaking and writing to persuade or influence people; esp. the power of pleasing or persuading an audience,” (Garner, B., p. 1580).
The specific changes to executive foreign policy that have occurred over time have established precedent both naturally, by necessity; and artificially, by choice. Washington sought to stay out of foreign affairs; and to gain the consent of Congress before investing America into foreign intervention. Washington’s approach was evident in his writings, years before his presidency. Washington wrote in 1783 that it was “indispensable to the happiness of the individual States, that there should be lodged somewhere, a Supreme Power to regulate and govern the general concerns of the Confederated Republic, without which the Union cannot be of long duration,” (Washington, G., p. 321). And that “[t]he Treaties of the European Powers with the United States of America, will have no validity on a dissolution of the Union,” (Washington, G., p. 322). Similarly, as president Washington warned that “foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of Republican Government,” (Washington, G., pp. 1339-1340). Concisely, Washington proposed an obligation of neutrality and an impartial hand or service to foreign nations.
American foreign policy was founded on five essential components that, when combined, ensure a resilient and longstanding Republic; invulnerable to influence, authority, or tyranny of foreign nations. These components include: (1) the recognition of (a) God’s presupposed natural law, (b) the standing of Western tradition, and (c) English common law; (2) authoritative deference to God ; (3) impartiality toward others, and neutrality toward other nations; (4) sovereignty and non-interventionism; and (5) exemplary influence and reverence to executive precedent.
For any president to stray his foreign policy from America’s founding tradition is to negate the fundamental importance the Framers specifically ensured to invest into the Constitution. Although the Constitution’s Article II appoints the president as the commander in chief, it does not grant him executive autonomy to wage war without Congress. Moreover, while the Constitution’s Article II allows for the president to make treaties with foreign nations, it does not permit him to embrace global foreign alliances that seek to supplant their our constitutions over the rights of American citizens. To do this, is to irresponsibly drive the nation into uncharted waters, drifting its tradition. As it is asked by Christ, “[c]an a blind man lead a blind man? Will they not both fall into a pit?” (Luke 6:39; ESV).
Thus, presidential U.S. foreign policy speeches play an important role in the momentum of the American nation. Arriving in all forms, from Farewell Addresses, to State of the Unions, to Graduation Ceremonies, foreign policy shaping rhetoric can be found throughout America’s presidency.
George Washington (1789–1797)
George Washington’s (1732–1799) strategic goal in every presidential statement was the promotion of righteous union. There was not a point where Washington took an opportunity to venerate himself, and, like the apostles, consistently rejected praise, worship, and titles of nobility.
Washington’s Farewell address was not different. After eight years in office, Washington needed to set precedent for a lasting Republic, thus he recused himself from office after two terms, opting against the suggestions from many of his peers to seek reelection. Mingst and McKibben note that “Founding fathers such as the United States’ George Washington . . .were able to have a great impact because they led in the early years of their nations’ lives,” (Mingst & McKibben, p. 131).
Washington warned in his farewell address that, “[i]t is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world,” instead calling for “[h]armony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest,” (Archives). Washington declared that “even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand: neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences;” (Archives). Washington warned that “[e]xcessive partiality for one foreign nation, and excessive dislike of another, cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other,” (Washington, G., p. 1337).
Thus, a Washington-like originalist approach to foreign policy bears a “duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without anything more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and amity towards other nations,” (Archives).
James Monroe (1817–1825)
Similarity. James Monroe’s (1758-1831) executive actions comported with Washington’s presidency, specifically the rhetoric given during his Farewell Address. Washington warned against foreign alliances, instead advocating the promotion of peace and neutrality. Monroe’s presidential actions began the executive trend of imposing Doctrine in U.S. foreign policy.
On December 2nd, 1823, Fifth U.S. President James Monroe, noted in his seventh annual message to Congress, that “I deem it proper to present this view of public affairs in greater detail than might otherwise be necessary,” (Frohnen, B., p. 482). The Monroe Doctrine “warns European nations that the United States would not tolerate further colonization or puppet monarchs,” (Archives).
Monroe noted the impossibility “that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness;” (Archives). Conversely, Monroe sighted the unlikeliness that “our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord,” (Archives). Thus, Monroe believe it to be ”equally impossible, therefore, that [America] should behold such interposition in any form with indifference,” (Archives). Like Washington, Monroe believed that America would be geopolitically neutral. Also like Washington, Monroe was prepared to wage war against anyone that threatened the United States by physical proximity.
Despite his initial hesitancy to embrace the Constitution, and refusal to sign; President Monroe and his administration operated with patriotic reverence. Monroe, citing the previous set precedent by Washington, he wrote that “I do it, however, with a personal satisfaction, from a knowledge that in this respect I shall comply more fully with the sound principles of our Government,” (Frohnen, B., p. 482). Monroe concluded in his proclamation that “[a] precise knowledge of our relations with foreign powers . . . [is] particularly necessary,” (Frohnen, B., p. 483).
T. Roosevelt (1901–1909)
Similarities. Despite Theodore “Teddy” Roosevelt’s (1858–1919) reverence of the Framers’ system, he sought to revise the Monroe Doctrine, expanding it in accordance with the necessary conditions of his time. His actions did not establish new precedent, instead revised existing doctrine as had been conducted long before the nation’s inception.
Roosevelt was a masterful in the delivery of his speeches. Roosevelt remarked that “[t]he peace of tyrannous terror, the peace of craven weakness, the peace of injustice, all these should be shunned as we shun unrighteous war,” (Archives).
In line with the Founding Fathers, Teddy reminded Americans that “[t]he goal to set before us as a nation, the goal which should be set before all mankind, is the attainment of the peace of justice,” (Archives). Specifically, Roosevelt noted that “the peace which comes when each nation is not merely safe-guarded in its own rights, but scrupulously recognizes and performs its duty toward others.” (Archives).
Secondly, that “[g]enerally peace tells for righteousness; but if there is conflict between the two, then our fealty is due first to the cause of righteousness,“ (Archives).
Roosevelt added a Biblical parable under the context of foreign policy, that “[t]here must be no effort made to remove the mote from our brother’s eye if we refuse to remove the beam from our own.,” (Archives).
Similarly, Jesus warned, “[w]hy do you see the speck that is in your brother’s eye, but do not notice the log that is in your own eye?” (Luke 6:41; ESV). Jesus guides us with correction, decreeing “[y]ou hypocrite, first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take out the speck that is in your brother’s eye,” (Luke 6:42b; ESV). Thus, Roosevelt concluded “[w]hat form the action shall take must depend upon the circumstances of the case; that is, upon the degree of the atrocity and upon our power to remedy it,” (Archives).
Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921)
Inconsistencies. Woodrow Wilson, (1856–1924) like Washington, Monroe, and Roosevelt, sought to promote peace. Unlike Washington, Monroe, and Roosevelt, Wilson’s national security was contingent on other nation’s ascribing to a universal doctrine of world-peace. Yet, here, Wilson’s speech was ultimately used to end World War I, effectively thwarting further engagement in domestic wars or foreign conflict.
On January 8th, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson delivered his “14 points as a blueprint for world peace that was to be used for peace negotiations after World War I,” (Archives). Wilson employed similar rhetoric to Washington, relying on the assurance of peace rather than employing national force. Wilson advocation for peace would be adopted into the Treaty of Versailles, ending World War I and further precluding America’s involvement. Similarly to Washington, Wilson’s proposition for peace “called for self-determination, the right of national groups to self-rule,” (Mingst & McKibben, p. 36).
Wilson listed specifically fourteen-point program for world peace, writing;
(1) [o]pen covenants of peace . . . [and] diplomacy “in the public view;”
(2) [a]bsolute freedom of navigation upon the seas;
(3) [t]he removal . . . of all economic barriers and trade conditions among all [peaceful] nations;
(4) national armaments “reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety;”
(5) nations’ populations concerned must have “equal weight with the equitable claims of the government;”
(6) [t]he evacuation of all Russian territory; naming it the “acid test of their good will;”
(7) the evacuation and restoration of Belgium;
(8) the freedom and restoration of French territory;
(9) a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy;
(10) safeguards and assurances to the people of Austria-Hungary;
(11) the evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro;
(12) the Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire to be “assured a secure sovereignty,” alongside “the other nationalities” under Turkish rule;
(13) [a]n independent Polish state; and
(14) a “general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike,” (Archives).
Unlike George Washington, Wilson’s plan to produce a global utopia did not succeed, as “[t]he political weight of the League was weakened by the fact that the United States—whose president Woodrow Wilson had been the League’s principal architect—itself refused to join, retreating instead to an isolationist foreign policy,” (Mingst & McKibben, p. 36).
Unlike Monroe, Wilson’s plan was contingent on international unanimity. James Monroe’s Monroe Doctrine relied only on the inaction of other nations—it was not a call to action. Worse, “[n]or did Russia join, nor were any of the vanquished states of the war permitted to participate;” thus, “[t]he League’s legal authority was weak, and the instruments it had for enforcing the peace, namely sanctions, proved ineffective,” (Mingst & McKibben, p. 37).
Wilson’s fourteen-point program for peace produced siginificant changes in American foreign policy. Following the resolution of World War I, “[l]iberalism and its utopian and idealist elements were replaced by realism as the dominant international relations theory—a fundamentally divergent theoretical perspective,” (Mingst & McKibben, p. 37).
FDR (1933–1945)
Inconsistencies. On December 9th, 1941, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882–1945) gave a “fireside chat” on the war with Japan, remarking that, “[f]reedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights and keep them,” (Mingst & Mckibben, p. 364). Speaking on behalf of the American people, FDR stated that “I am sure that the people in every part of this nation in their individual living to win this war,” (Archives).
FDR noted that sacrifice would have to be made for those on the battlefield, and those at home; as resources would be needed to win the war against Nazidom. Roosevelt warned that “the Japanese are claiming that as a result of their action against Hawaii, they have gained naval supremacy in the Pacific. This is an old trick of propaganda which has been used innumerable times by the Nazis . . . to spread fear and confusion among us,” (Archives).
Like Washington, FDR noted “I was determined to exhaust every conceivable effort for peace . . . to the Empire of Japan,” (FDRLibrary).
Truman (1945–1953)
Inconsistencies. Unlike the Founding Fathers who focused their rhetoric on the necessity of the Republic; Harry S. Truman’s (1884–1972) rhetoric sought the illusive pursuit of democracy. Unlike a republic, which has a definitive meaning; democracy has many different forms—allowing for its equivocated use by subsequent politicians.
America is not a pure democracy, that is, it does not succumb to the will of the majority. As seen in the failure of the Seventeenth Amendment, majority rule does not always elect the best results, and are easily persuaded to groupthink compliance—supported by their own incumbency advantage.
On March 12th,1947, President Truman stood before Congress with personal conviction, stating, “[t]he gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress,” (Archives).
Truman noted that “[t]he United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance,” (Archives). Greece’s government had requested funding “for $400 million in military and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey” (Archives). Truman believed “[t]here is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn;” thus, he “established a policy, aptly characterized as the Truman Doctrine,” (Archives). This policy remained central to U.S. foreign policy for subsequent decades. Truman’s doctrine and its “related ‘domino theory’ [guided] U.S. foreign policy around the world for the next 40 years,” (Archives).
Truman utilized personal significance to target the pathos in his persuasion of Congress, submitting that “[n]o government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected,” (Archives).
Like the neoliberal perspective seen today, “[t]he Greek Government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek Government has done or will do,” (Archives).
Concisely, “President Truman declared, ‘[i]t must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,’” (Archives). His statement remains the resounding pretext for U.S. executive intervention around the world, diverting America from its originalist Founding Fathers’ non-interventionist position.
Eisenhower (1953–1961)
Similarities. Like Washington and Monroe, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s (1890–1969) primary goal in foreign policy was that “security and liberty may prosper together,” (Archives).
On January 17th, 1961, President Eisenhower warned in his Farewell Address that “[o]ur military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime,” (Archives). Eisenhower attested that “[u]ntil the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry,” (Archives).
Upon exit of his presidency, Eisenhower gave Americans a strong warning regarding “the dangers of the ‘military-industrial complex,’” (Archives).
Carter (1977–1981)
Inconsistences. Jimmy Carter (1924-2024) held the faith of Washington, the institutionalism of Eisenhower, and the utopian views of Wilson; leaving him inconsistent with the Framers’ originalist depiction of foreign policy. Unlike Washington, Carter formed international alliances in order to combat foreign enemies, entwining America’s government with concerning entities and influences.
Carter spoke with polarizing rhetoric, “clearly defin[ing] the foundation of his foreign policy: ‘Our policy is based on a historical vision of America’s role. Our policy is derived from a larger view of global change," (State). Clearly, Carter’s “historical vision” of American foreign policy was inconsistent with George Washington’s originalist perspective.
Carter added that “[o]ur policy is rooted in our moral values, which never change. Our policy is reinforced by our material wealth and by our military power. Our policy is designed to serve mankind.’” (State). Similarly to Washington, Carter took into account moral values as a monumental factor in his decision-making and political rhetoric.
President Carter’s administration funded anti-Soviet radical Islamic groups to thwart the encroachment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. These groups would become the modern terrorist organizations that directly threaten U.S. national security.
Authors Mongst and McKibben cite that “the United States bore a “historic and oftentimes rhetorical commitment to human rights;” observable during the Carter administration that “was known for its strong support of human rights,” (Mingst & Mckibben, p. 365).
It was Carter who noted that “to be secure we must face the world as it is,” (USEOP). Carter added that “[w]e will never abandon our struggle for a just and a decent society here at home. That's the heart of America, and it's the source of our ability to inspire other people to defend their own rights abroad,” (USEOP).
Reagan (1981–1989)
Differences. Like Washington, Ronald Reagan (1911-2004) spoke with diplomacy, stating that “beginning 10 years ago, the Soviets challenged the Western alliance with a grave new threat hundreds of new and more deadly SS-20 nuclear missiles. capable of striking every capital in Europe,” (ReaganLibrary). Unlike Washington, Reagan visited the foreign nations that he wished to enact a change benevolent to America and global coexistence of nations. Also unlike Washington, Reagan strived to actively change the method of governance of other nations, believing that Communism would eventually spread, inevitably impacting America, if not for our direct influence.
Like Washington, Reagan noted that “[t]he totalitarian world produces backwardness because it does such violence to the spirit; thwarting the human impulse to create, to enjoy to worship,” (ReaganLibrary).
But similarly to Washington, Reagan spoke prophetically, declaring by the words of a ‘young Berliner’ that "[t]his wall will fall. Beliefs become reality,” (ReaganFoundation). Unlike Wilson’s foreign policy contingent on multinational compliance; Reagan, like Washington spoke personably, with individual conviction in his call to action. Also like Washington and the Founding Fathers, Reagan deferred his authority to his faith in God. Reagan added that “[y]es, across Europe , this wall will fall. For it cannot withstand faith. It cannot withstand truth. The wall cannot withstand freedom. Thank you. God bless you all,” (ReaganFoundation).
Bush Jr. (2001–2009)
Inconsistencies. Bush’s foreign policy was inconsistent with any former U.S. president to the extent that new departments had to be formed in order to fulfill the obligations he imposed on it. Horrifyingly, members of Bush’s administration were responsible for the attacks on 9/11.
Whether of the party that believes (1) that 9/11 was curated by the government to encroach the surveillance state; or the party who believes (2) middle-eastern terrorists are technological geniuses with extensive resources, capable of evading every facet of government in the most secure nation on earth; it is clear that Bush’s administration was responsible. The attacks should have been prevented, and under more consistent administration similarly to Washington with the difference of James Monroe. Nonetheless, it greenlit government to metastasize.
Following the horrific atrocities that occurred on 9/11, Bush gave speech for West Point’s graduation in June 2002. Bush’s speech opened with a reference to American history. Denoting the West Point distinction between Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant; Bush admitted he was more of a Grant-style rebel in college. Further Bush referenced former President Eisenhower, who remarked upon graduation at West Point that “[f]rom here on, it would be the nation I would be serving, not myself." (Archives).
Bush spoke that “Our war on terror is only begun, but in Afghanistan it was begun well,” adding “This war will take many turns we cannot predict,” (Archives). Yet Bush did not consult with Congress to formally declare a war. Instead he utilized his executive powers to launch an international war that would share concurrent responsibility domestically in its oversight. The result was a total invasion of government surveillance, and the further encroachment of autonomous government. Bush worked to unchain the Leviathan from its laissez-faire state, permitting its ubiquitous omnipotence.
Unlike the Founding Fathers’ deference to God and the posterity of America; Bush’s words commended his own executive discretion. Bush used rhetoric like “I am proud of the men and women who have fought on my orders,” to paint himself as the supreme authority, rather than giving reverence to God, the Constitution, the nation’s founding principles, or the posterity of the union.
Obama (2009–2017)
Inconsistences. If given the capacity, George Washington would not have launched a drone strike on King George III’s convoy—no matter the barbarism of his rhetoric. James Monroe secured America’s defense by proximity, not by ubiquity of ideology.
Unlike the Founding Fathers, Obama sought to employ a national defense beyond proximity. Obama’s false rhetoric gave the illusion of a national threat. Obama warned that “Qaddafi declared he would show ‘no mercy’ to his own people. He compared them to rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment.” (Archives). Washington remained undeterred by King Henry III in the fulfillment of his duties as president, and the executive precedent of neutrality and non-interventionism. Obama implied that this despotic mentality may soon somehow arrive on the doorsteps of American citizens. Ironically, Obama employed executive autonomy to drone strike Libyan Leader Momar Ghaddafi, leading to his untimely execution by radical partisans. Obama warned that “[i]n the past, we have seen him hang civilians in the streets, and kill over a thousand people in a single day.” (Archives). Obama used this pretext to forge justification in the killing of the Libyan leader, proving his allegiance to the deepstate.
While the kill was ordered by Hilary Clinton, Obama willingly approved, taking responsibility for his assassination. Obama’s actions made America appear weak. Further, it did not help, instead sending the nation of Libya into initial anarchy, and delayed division. Today Libya remains divided, and its union and national prosperity hindered; “Libya is still divided between two governments: the Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in Tripoli and a government in Benghazi supported by the warlord Khalifa Haftar,” (AtlanticCouncil). But Obama’s heroic legacy lives on as the mainstream media continues to support the narrative that foreign entanglement to ensure the mutual destruction of international enemies is essential.
Worse, Obama set precedent that foreign policy ought to be motivated by ideology, not a threat by proximity to national security.
Trump (2017–2021)
Similarities. Like Washington, Trump’s speech in Poland began with a statement of peace. Like Monroe, Trump drew distinct boundaries to signify an assurance of national security, thereby allowing the investment of international compliance. Trump remarked that “We’ve come to your nation to deliver a very important message: America loves Poland, and America loves the Polish people, (Archives). While Trump embraced the nation and its citizens, he warned that “[w]e are fighting hard against radical Islamic terrorism, and we will prevail,” adding “[w]e cannot accept those who reject our values and who use hatred to justify violence against the innocent,” (Archives).
On globalization, Trump showed impartiality to foreign entanglement, stating “[w]e urge Russia to cease its destabilizing activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, and its support for hostile regimes — including Syria and Iran — and to instead join the community of responsible nations in our fight against common enemies and in defense of civilization itself,” (Archives). Trump’s words depict impartiality as a state of responsibility. This directly correlates with George Washington’s vision for America’s non-interventional foreign policy.
In the spirit of realism, presupposing a state of international anarchy, Trump noted that “Americans, Poles, and the nations of Europe value individual freedom and sovereignty,” (Archives).
Biden (2021–2025)
Inconsistences. George Washington, James Monroe, and Theodore Roosevelt held distinct responsibility and direct accountability for their executive actions. In speeches they remarked on the union of Americans, rather than Truman’s, Bush’s, or Obama’s polarized rhetoric. Washington, Monroe, and Roosevelt would have utilized mindful rhetoric, and careful logic when conducting the formal withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan. Former U.S. President Joe Biden’s actions did not reflect any dignified behavior, nor did it display righteous stewardship of diplomacy.
On August 16th, 2021 Joe Biden proclaimed that “[o]ur mission in Afghanistan was never supposed to have been nation building. It was never supposed to be creating a unified centralized democracy,” (YouTube). Unlike Washington, Biden committed a logical fallacy, imposing a false dichotomy. Biden declared “[t]he choice I had to make, as your President, was either to follow through on that agreement or be prepared to go back to fighting the Taliban in the middle of the spring fighting season,” (YouTube). In an attempt to explain his lack of planning and preparation, Biden submitted that “[a]fter 20 years, I've learned the hard way that there was never a good time to withdraw US forces. That's why we're still there,” (YouTube).
Like Washington, Biden acknowledged America’s primary role to defend its homeland. Biden stated, “[o]ur only vital national interest in Afghanistan remains today what it has always been, preventing a terrorist attack on American homeland,” (YouTube).
Unlike George Washington, Former President Joe Biden’s lack of accountability and poor planning remains a national disgrace, and harrowing end of a twenty-year war that left “[o]ver 7,000 U.S. service members [dead] in post-9/11 war zones including Afghanistan and Iraq,” (Watson). And “[o]ver 8,000 private contractors also died while providing logistical and security support to U.S. troops. The U.S. government does not thoroughly report contractor deaths,” (Watson). Biden did not note these statistics at the time of his withdrawal.
Also unlike George Washington, Joe Biden’s egregious lack of preparations left 13 U.S. service members dead. Also unlike Washington, Joe Biden went down as the worst president in the history of the American nation. In a poll of roughly 5,500 veterans, 73 percent said that “the Afghanistan withdrawal negatively impacted the way they percieve the Global War on Terror,” (MilitaryTimes). Moreover, 83 percent noted “they were dissatisfied with the lack of accountability from senior civilian and military officials in how they handled the withdrawal,” (MilitaryTimes).
The Brookings Institute states that “Seven in ten veterans believe that ‘America did not leave Afghanistan with honor,’ and 57% of all Americans agree,” (Brookings).
On foreign policy, Biden declared North Korea's leader to be “a thug,” unlike the founding principle of acting diplomatically, no matter the ideological differences.
Unlike Washington, Biden showed immense partiality against other nations, acting in his own self-interest to wage war, funding the proxy war against Russia through Ukraine. Rather than acting diplomatically to preclude the escalation of WWIII, Biden funded neo-Nazi battalions, like the Azov Battalion in Ukraine. On October 28th, 2018 Special Agent Scott Bierwirth swore in an affidavit under oath that “I know that the Azov Battalion is a paramilitary unit of the Ukranian National Guard which is known for its association with neo-Nazi ideology and use of Nazi symbolism, and which is believed to have participated in training and radicalizing United States-based white supremacy organizations,” (CourtHouse). Unlike James Monroe’s Monroe Doctrine, or Teddy Roosevelt’s necessary expansion; Joe Biden imposed his own version of doctrine-by-proximity, centralized in Ukraine. There is no significant reason America should have funneled money to a terroristic government linked criminally to members of the U.S. government.
Like Carter, Biden lost public support after just one term. The one positive action Biden took during his presidency was his nomination of Kamala Harris as his successor, thereby thwarting the deepstate agenda, and rightfully returning American foreign policy to its state of originalism. Like Washington and Monroe, President Trump’s second term has been marked by his diplomacy, strengthening of domestic defenses, and non-interventionism.
Conclusion
In sum, George Washington, James Monroe, and Theodore Roosevelt sought to preserve America by proximity. These presidents acted righteously, relying on the bolstering of national defenses, rather than the display of presidential authority and ability of national firepower. Reagan carried the proximity of America with him as he traveled abroad, his rhetoric displaying his individual allegiance to the Founders’ principles and the consensus of their direction. Trump followed in Reagan’s footsteps, speaking with diplomacy and dignity in foreign nations, and opting to negotiation rather than mobilize forces on behalf of ideology or illusive democracy. Inconsistently, Carter, Obama, Bush, and Biden acted against the sound precedent of our nation’s Founders, negating the system they were elected to operate and preserve.
Conclusively, Washington’s precedent of non-interventionism, neutrality, and his warnings against foreign entanglement remain central to the obligations that the modern executive bears during his incumbency. Now, Trump’s second presidency seeks to invoke similar foreign policy standards as Theodore Roosevelt in the sense of ad hoc expansions to the Monroe Doctrine, redefining and clarifying America’s territorial boundaries. Thus, respective to Washington’s foreign policy the modern executive ought to act peacefully, and diplomatically; thereby remaining untethered to any permanent global alliance beyond what is necessary within contemporary geopolity.
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