Plato and the Nature of Justice
In Book I of the Republic, several attempts are made to pinpoint an explanation for justice in the dialogue, concluding that justice is an axiom representative of inherent value. Thrasymachus, a sophist, asserts to Socrates that the concept of justice itself is subject to inquiry, to unveil whether it manifests virtue or evil; secondly, he strives to uncover the distinct notable advantages between the just and the unjust, (Jowett, B., p. 24). Translator Benjamin Jowett (1817-1893) expounds on Thrasymachus’s considerations and attempts to define justice, writing, that justice holds no external interest, nor is it aimed at excess; instead “justice is to happiness what the implement of the workman is to his work;” implying happiness is essential to justice, (Jowett, B., p. 24).
Thrasymachus boasted that justice was obvious; it was the advantage of the stronger, adding that perfect injustice was more gainful than perfect justice, (Jowett, B., p. 23). Thrasymachus asserts “[m]y claim is that morality is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger party, (Waterfield, R., p. 18). Thrasymachus claims justice is obeying the ruler, submitting “it is the same in every country, and it is what is to the advantage of the current government,” (Waterfield, R., p. 19). Thrasymachus then attempts to affirm Socrates’s inquiry, – that justice is vice; the just seek to prevail against the unjust, whereas the unjust strive to depose both the just and unjust. this admission stages Socrates’ second seemingly innocuous inquiry, “did you mean to define morality as what appears to the stronger party to be to its advantage, whether or not it really is to its advantage?” (Waterfield, R., p. 21). This results in Thrasymachus’s dismissal, as Socrates reminds him that rulers and not infallible and make mistakes. Thrasymachus declares Socrates a bully in conversation, asserting that “[i]n any and every situation, a moral person is worse off than an immoral one… immorality—if practised on a large enough scale—has more power, licence, [sic] and authority than morality,” (Waterfield, R., pp. 26, 27). Thrasymachus proclaims “morality is really the advantage of the stronger party, while immorality is profitable and advantageous to oneself,” at this point, he is forced to stay and explain his claims.
Socrates responds to Thrasymachus’s with rational analysis, first asking if injustice is virtue and justice is vice. By Thrasymachus’s account, the just pursue against the unjust, whereby the unjust pursue both just and unjust equally, therefore the unjust bear more authority. Socrates addresses the inspiration of competent professionals, namely musicians and doctors, whereby neither expert declares other experts rivals, instead striving to surpass only nonexperts, in order to maintain a standard; evil is not a principle of strength – “is not absolute injustice weakness also?” (Jowett, B., p. 23). Absolute conditioning cannot facilitate justice, for it bears no virtue; thereby absolutism is based on subjectivity, thus omitting the production of happiness. Justice and happiness are empirically consistently entwined, therefore there cannot exist further question as to whether the unjust are happier than the just, (Jowett, B., p. 24). Thrasymachus reasserts that “morality is really the advantage of the stronger party, while immorality is profitable and advantageous to oneself,” (Waterfield, R., p. 27).
Socrates concludes, successfully refutes Thrasymachus’s position, implying “reductio ad absurdum that justice is a thief;” justice strives to thieve for the “good of friends and the harm of enemies,” declaring that justice cannot produce injustice; Black’s Dictionary clarifies reductio ad absurdum as the “disproof of an argument by showing it that it leads to a ridiculous conclusion,” (Jowett, B., p. 26; Garner, B., p. 1531). Socrates asks “is not the end of the soul happiness, and justice the excellence of the soul by which happiness is attained?” (Jowett, B., p. 24).
Socrates’s rebuttal resulted in Thrasymachus’s total pacification, thereby stating “injustice can never be more profitable than justice… For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy;” concluding the Republic’s Book One, (Jowett, B., pp. 264, 265). Plato aptly presents justice as a multifaceted concept, one that must remain simultaneously adaptable and insulated from personal bias; to understand justice in its entirety, one must avoid implementing their own subjective presupposition. Socrates instead exposes that absolute claims of justice indulge tyranny and fallacious conclusions; justice must be based on empirical evidence, yet omit the many variables needed the provide an absolute basis, leaving the meaning justice implicit with the exit of Book One; justice and happiness are proven to be intrinsically interlinked; yet no conclusion is explicitly revealed; encouraging the reader to continue onto the next Book of the Republic. Benjamin Jowett invokes an allusion to Scripture; “[a] house that is divided against itself cannot stand,” (Mat 12:25; Mark 3:25; Luke 11:17). Objective truth is essential for sustainable happiness, thereby facilitating justice; “[a] corrupt witness makes a mockery of justice,” (Proverbs 19:28a; TPT). As Paul reminds us in Romans, scribing from His Holy Spirit; “[t]herefore, my brethren, you also were made to die to the Law through the body of Christ, so that you might be joined to another, to Him who was raised from the dead, in order that we might bear fruit for God,” (Romans 7:4; NASB). The contemporary meaning stands correlative to the implicit virtue-based origin of the term; Black’s Law Dictionary defines justice as “[t]he fair treatment of people; the quality of being fair and reasonable; the legal system by which people and their causes are judged,” (Garner, B., p. 1033). Similar to Thrasymachus, John Rawls asserts that “[t]he principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance,” (Rawls, J., p. 11).
Conclusion
Book One of Plato’s Republic initially strives to answer the question of justice, yet its conclusion empowers the reader to pursue pondering the meaning of justice as the convergence of spiritual ideals, id est human perfection; yet discouraging the reader from making absolute assumptions about definitive justice; beyond explicitly stating that the just are more content than the unjust, (Jowett, B., p. 8). Plato reminds us justice is rooted in virtue; justice on all occasions finds itself dependent on unforeseeable conditional factors, requiring some aspect of objective discernment; Socrates entwined the just with happiness, refuting that the unjust preside over the just; by this logic. Socrates successfully refutes Thrasymachus, who as a result is “reduced to silence at the close of the first book,” (Jowett, B., p. 10). Plato writes that Socrates was “not of this world,” revealing that justice is an activity unlike other activities; without harming others, and only bringing benefit; thus producing a happier individual; ultimately extending that contentment to society, (Jowett, B., p. 16).
Bibliography
Garner, B.A. (2021). Black's Law Dictionary, Eleventh Edition. St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters.
NASB. Romans 7:4
Plato. (1888). The Republic: Translated by Benjamin Jowett. G-Ph Ballin. Kindle Edition.
Proverbs 19:28a
Waterfield, Robin. (1993). Republic (Oxford World's Classics). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.
Rawls, John. (1971, 1999). A Theory of Justice (Belknap) Harvard University Press. Kindle Edition.