On the Federalist Paper No. 10

Federalists James Madison (1731–1836), Alexander Hamilton (1757–1804), and John Jay (1745–1829) wrote 85 essays under the pseudonym Publius; invoking Aristotelian political theory to facilitate the same limited constitution argued by Cicero—a balanced network of absolute regimes, ensuring that no one party would obtain dominion. James Madison’s 3000-word Federalist Paper No. 10 reveals the importance of a centralized national government capable of disarming violent rebellions. Shays’s Rebellion (1786–1787) displayed the unwillingness of Massachusetts’s neighboring States to utilize their own resources in defense against the aggrieved militia of civilians; representing a remarkable turning point in the perception of American legislators. Power had to be concentrated in a way that would be limited, yet allow for an encroachment of rights to prevent insurrection; ultimately catalyzing the process of unionizing—one year later a nationalized Constitution would be established. Madison’s Federalist Paper No. 10 Madison proposed that a majority consensus can be achieved, driving the nation; while still respecting the interests of the minority. Madison’s Federalist No. 10’s introduction begins, implicitly citing Shay’s Rebellion, whereby Madison penned, “[a]mong the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed, than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p. 42).

Federalism would require the authoritative usurpation of sovereign power, thereby Publius offered the call for a centralization national authority as a refuge from the threat of domestic militia. Madison declared “[t]he friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p. 42). Madison declared instability, injustice, and confusion to be “mortal diseases;” citing the autopsy of fallen government, that relied on popularity, writing; “[t]he instability, injustice, and confusion, introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have every where perished; as they continue to be the favourite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p. 42). James Madison warned that despite the effectiveness of State Constitutions, their independence was itself futile apart from centralized union; writing, “[t]he valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p. 42).

On Aristocracy, Madison opined “[c]omplaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable;” adding a need for greater civic representation that “the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p. 42). Madison was himself advocating for majoritarian rule; checked but not driven by limitations imposed by minority representation. Contemporary polity has inverted this principle, unevenly distributing power to minority politics — self-serving special interest groups, whos interests correlate with the state. Madison warned the mass influx of complaints was likely to produce an inherent anxiety, offering solace in the centralization of power and the voluntary renouncement of total sovereignty for the implicit greater good, writing “[h]owever anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labour, have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., pp. 42, 43).

Shay’s Rebellion

James Madison reanimated Shays’s Rebellion (1786–1787), noting that, “[t]hese must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations;” defining with specificity, “[b]y a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 43).

Next, Madison proposed a false dichotomy: either (a) completely eradicate civic dissent, or (b) control individual resistance. Logically, (b) being controlled is a far superior alternative than (a) total eradication. Madison’s public threat to (a) “remove its causes,” was met with a second false dichotomy to the people: (x) exterminate national liberty or (y) force equality through national usurpation of inherent sovereignty, siphoning an undisclosed percentage of authority from the citizenry. Madison wrote, “[t]here are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: The one, [a] by removing its causes; the other, by [b] controling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: The one, by [x] destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, [y] by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. It could never be more truly said, than of the first remedy, that it is worse than the disease,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 43).

James Madison offered an analogy; “Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment, without which it instantly expires,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p. 43). Conversely, Jesus reminds us in The New Testament that “[e]veryone will be salted with fire,” another translation reads, “[f]or everyone will be tested with fire,” (Mark 9:49; NIV; NLT). It was His Holy Spirit who was revealed by “a pillar of fire [that] appeared before their eyes. It separated into tongues of fire that engulfed each one of them. They were all filled and equipped with the Holy Spirit and were inspired to speak in tongues—empowered by the Spirit to speak in languages they had never learned!” (Acts 2:3-4; TPT). In The Old Testament Moses speaks to God through Fire; as “the LORD appeared to him in a flame of fire within a bush. As Moses looked, he saw that the bush was on fire but was not consumed. So Moses thought, ‘I must go over and look at this remarkable sight. Why isn’t the bush burning up?’” (Exodus 3:2-3; CSB). There are many instances in Scripture that indicate fire—especially His internal flame—to be the presence of God and a compass to guide us to earthly liberty and eternal salvation. Was James Madison right in extinguishing Daniel Shays’s merited fire of dissidence against government exploitation; thereby invoking his own form of absolute governance? The Federal Government’s reaction to Shay’s Rebellion displays characteristics of a shift from State interests to National interests—Confederate Libertarianism to Autocratic Utilitarianism—under the pretext of republican mixed government; id est Democracy.

According to The Mount Version Association on Shays’s Rebellion, General Benjamin Lincoln sent “1,500 men on January 25, 1787;” to combat the armed militia’s peaceful resistance against government tyranny. Benjamin Lincoln’s army “fired warning shots followed by artillery fire, killing four of the insurgents and wounding twenty,” (MountVernon). This act of democide represented the Federalist’s opportunity to gain hegemony over any other faction; settling on the concentration of power to prevent a backlash against the intentional murder of civilians. To further ease civic discourse, the Federalists granted amnesty to all dissidents including Daniel Shays’s who went on the fight in the national army after Constitutional ratification. As witnessed today, civilians were not given a decision on the matter to centralize national power; instead new national policy was briskly ratified to centralize power in the hands of well-educated policymakers; under the basis that it would not be exploited from within, nor radicalized to denounce competing regimes required for an Aristotelian mixed constitution. As Anti-Federalist Thomas Jefferson diligently reminds us; “[r]ebellion to tyrants is obedience to God,” (Jefferson, T.; Dreisbach, D., p. 10). Could Shays’s Rebellion have been a false flag operation to usher in top-down governance, and concentrate an expansive and elastic omnipotent pervasive power? Shays’s Rebellion represented a national opportunity to centralize power, siphoning sovereignty from the individual to facilitate a simulated state of control. The national government often exploits opportunities to breach national security, themselves becoming complicit in the disruption of union. This tactic invokes fear throughout the population, calling for greater government intervention, and the renouncement of rights. Similar effects of federal encroachment have been seen following the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine, the sinking of the Lusitania, the attack on Pearl Harbor, the attack on 9/11, numerous oil pipeline explosions, and the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemonium—all contingent on the United States’ inaction, resulting in devastating crises. Was the United States government consciously evasive during these abhorrent crises? Or, did each instance represent a position of vulnerability in our union? By both accounts, American polis hath borne an inflammatory absolute regime striving to redefine civic liberty, abscond justice, and abandon individual sovereignty.  Could the other States have been told to “back down” from assisting Massachusetts during Shays’s Rebellion to reshuffle the cards; thus inducing similar effects? Withholding information to harm civil liberties, especially when executed with malice and the intent to move the pendulum closer to the authoritative state, should constitute treason—yet it remains the purview of the national government itself to declare such grievances.

Madison produced commentaries on his own illusory dichotomies stating; “[b]ut it could not be a less folly to [x] abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 43).  James Madison invoked the slightest notion of demagoguery in his essay, assuring “[t]he diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to an uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties, is the first object of government,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 43). Madison’s declaration of government intervention on behalf of more diverse representation began the plunge into the observable state of contemporary Antipolis exuded by America.

Constitutional Convention

It was during the Philadelphia Convention (1787) that Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry (1736–1799) famously proclaimed “[g]ive me liberty or give me death!”—his words thereby setting the tone for Anti-Federalist dissident thought; advocating for the retainment of power within the individual, inevitably leading to the enumeration of rights by Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, (Henry, P.; Elson, J., p. 1). Patrick Henry attested in 1788 that “[t]he government is no more than a choice among evils is acknowledged by the most intelligent among mankind and has been a standing maxim for ages…There are certain maxims by which every wise and enlightened people will regulate their conduct. There are certain political maxims which no free people ever ought to abandon—maxims of which the observance is essential to the security of happiness,” (Henry, P.; Elson, J., p. 125). Patrick Henry disclosed the resounding fact that “[i]t is impiously irritating the avenging hand of heaven, when a people who are full of enjoyment of freedom launch out into the wide ocean of human affairs and desert those maxims which alone can preserve liberty,” (Henry, P.; Elson, J., p. 125). Henry’s same principles remain applicable to contemporary polity, whereby incumbent pol deprive citizens of inherent obligations to virtue, in exchange for artificially curated hierarchy of concerns; omitting constituent interests and individual representation. In opposition to Publius’s totalitarian tactics, Patrick Henry enumerated a political maxim retained by the citizen today; one that inspired the Bill of Rights, thereby imposing the first Ten Amendments to the Constitution. Patrick Henry boldly declared; “[a]ll men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity,” (Henry, P.; Elson, J., p. 126).

Madison recognized that “[f]rom the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties,” adding of man’s instinctual tendency to tribalize, denoting that “[t]he latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 44). Madison opposed the passions of the people, criticizing those with “[a] zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders, ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions, whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 44). Madison argued that passions are a threat to national liberty, writing that zealous individuals have “divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 43).

Madison warned against feeble minds influenced by fervor, adding “[s]o strong is this propensity of mankind, to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. James Madison, the same man who previously presented the false dichotomy—to either (x) exterminate national liberty or (y) force equality through national usurpation of inherent sovereignty—wrote in the same essay, that “the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 44). Madison expounded, “those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a monied interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 44). Was Madison trying to unite the people, or expose the differences between the interests of the citizen; thereby instigating a myth that diversity is an inherent danger, whose only remedy is centralizing power to the state? Madison presented civic interpersonal appeal as physical dangers, marking their origin as distinct interests. Historian Charles A. Beard concludes that “[l]arge and important groups of economic interests were adversely affected by the system of government under the Articles of Confederation, namely, those of public securities, shipping and manufacturing, money at interest; in short, capital as opposed to land,” (Beard, C., p. 63). The Federalist Papers support Beard’s conclusion; James Madison adding that “[t]he regulation of these various and interfering interests, forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 44).

Judgment and Justice

James Madison asserted that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay, with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties, at the same time;” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 44). Aristotle warned against self-judgment citing that “inequality is thought to be, and is, justice; neither is this for all, but only for unequals. When the persons are omitted, then men judge erroneously. The reason is that they are passing judgment on themselves, and most people are bad judges in their own case,” (Aristotle; Jowett, B., p. 55). Aristotle expounded that men “are bad judges in their own affairs; and secondly, because both the parties to the argument are speaking of a limited and partial justice, but imagine themselves to be speaking of absolute justice,” (Aristotle; Jowett, B., p. 55).

James Madison invoked self-defeating questions throughout the public, whereby independent discourse would be amplified in correlation with the need for national government state intervention, producing another false dichotomy; “what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens?” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 44). Madison believed that “Justice ought to hold the balance between them.” In direct opposition to his previous position, now refuting Aristotelian theory, Madison remarked that “the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges;” and that “the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction, must be expected to prevail.” Madison spoke of taxation, recognizing the temptation of legislators to exploit tax to the extent of tyranny. This trend has continued into the modern age, whereby Congress conjures up new methods of taxation not limited to carbon taxation. It appears the job of contemporary government to pollute the nation’s fluid viscosity with absolute policy—often absolutely terrible—descending the internal morale of the citizen to that of subject. Madison wrote that “[t]he apportionment of taxes, on the various descriptions of property, is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party, to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they over-burden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets. It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 45).

Of Aristocracy, Madison wrote that “[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm: nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be m[a]de at all, without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole. The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 45). If democide is not a viable option, legislated voluntary servitude stands to be. Madison presented methods of defeating tyrannical factions within a federalist system of nationalized government, writing that “[i]f a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views, by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the constitution,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 45).

Conversely, Madison displayed that “[w]hen a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add, that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long laboured, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 45).

Common Interests

Madison’s Federalist Paper No. 10 presents yet another false dichotomy offering the reader “one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority, at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 45). James Madison’s Publius penned that “[f]rom this view of the subject, it may be concluded, that a pure democracy, by which I mean, a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 46). Plato (427 B.C.–347 B.C.) highlighted the importance of common interests. Leo Strauss (1899-1973) wrote that Plato believed that “[t]he best regime is that in which a god or demon rules as in the age of Kronos, the golden age. The nearest imitation of divine rule is the rule of laws. But the laws in their turn depend on the man or men who can lay down and enforce the laws, i.e., the regime (monarchy, tyranny, oligarchy, aristocracy, democracy). In the case of each of these regimes a section of the city rules the rest, and therefore it rules the city with a view to a sectional interest, not to the common interest. We know already the solution to this difficulty: the regime must be mixed as it was in a way in Sparta and Crete, and it must adopt a code framed by a wise legislator,” (Strauss, L., pp. 133, 134).

Aristotle’s advocation of common passions held influence over Publius, whereby the Ancient Athenian philosopher previously noted that, “[t]he true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one or of the few, or of the many, are perversions. For the members of a state, if they are truly citizens, ought to participate in its advantages,” (Aristotle; Jowett, B., p 53). Relative to Aristotelian political theory, James Madison wrote that “[a] common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert, results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 46). Does “common interests” include majoritarian solutions proclaimed in response to devastating domestic disasters and curated crises? Publius advocated the replacement of American justice with power; moving the nation from an Aristotelian polis to a Hobbesian state. It was Thomas Hobbes that declared, that the “[r]eputation of power, is power; because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection,” declaring the attainment of power to be the “general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death,” (Hobbes, T.; Gaskin, C.A., pp. 58, 66).

Plato’s political theory displayed in The Republic suggested that “in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger, (Plato; Jowett, B., p. 246). Madison spoke similarly of democracies, writing “hence it is, that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 46).

Colonial Political Theory

James Madison denounced “[t]heoretic politicians, who have patronised this species of government, have erroneously supposed, that, by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 46). Publius’s paper strongly favored a Republic, whereby a government in which the scheme of representation promised an implicit “cure for which we are seeking,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 46). To better illustrate the differences between pure democracy and republicanism, James Madison wrote with expository prose, aiming to “examine the points in which [Republicanism] varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the union, (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 46). In contrast, Plato noted that, “democracy…naturally follows oligarchy;” adding that, “the States are as the men are; they grow out of human characters,” (Plato; Jowett, B., p. 468).

James Madison expressed similar evidence, that “[t]he two great points of difference, between a democracy and a republic, are, first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest;” adding that “secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.” Madison contended that “[t]he effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 46). When one considers the act of gaining permission through a “chosen body of [wise] citizens,” there exists a void in the place of the contemporary expectations of good governance. Madison opined that, “[u]nder such a regulation, it may well happen, that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 46). As if prophesying the egregious acts of tyranny that would be committed centuries later under the pretext of democracy; Madison warned, “On the other hand, the effect may be inverted,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 46). Had these nine words been more pronounced, the Philadelphia Convention may have resulted with a drastically different result. Madison claimed that “[m]en of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people. The question resulting is, “whether small or extensive republics are most favourable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favour of the latter by two obvious considerations,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47).

James Madison warned Americans to guard against “the cabals of a few,” prophesying the deepstate federal interventionists that seek to revile every sector of society to the image of despotic prepotency. Madison stated “[i]n the first place, it is to be remarked, that however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47).

Madison clarified on the malignity of electoral candidates; warning that “the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the constituents, and being proportionally greatest in the small republic, it follows, that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice;” Madison added that “[i]n the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47). James Madison revealed the seeds of deceit sewn into the concentration of absolute power, no matter the circumstance, submitting that “[i]t must be confessed, that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47).

Madison denoted the importance of proper representation, bringing focus to representation per capita. A federal constitution, Madison believed, would require a delicate balance between the interests of the minority and the ambitions of the majority. In order to retain a well-rounded nation—one that holds an equal triangle of national enforcement, individual inherent rights, and collective industrialization. Madison attested that “[b]y enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47). James Madison—patting Publius on the back—asserted that; “[t]he federal constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests, being referred to the national, the local and particular to the state legislatures,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47).

Madison remarked on the concentration of citizenry, noting that major cities would be better ruled by republican governance—mixed government—whereas smaller states can be subjected to democratic government; thereby precluding secession from the established union, and avoiding scenario (a): the complete eradication of domestic dissidents, especially state rebellion; “by removing its causes,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 43). These ideas in the words of Madison from which they originate, declare; “[t]he other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens, and extent of territory, which may be brought within the compass of republican, than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47). Madison’s political theory deduces, “[t]he smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47).

James Madison made another important position made in the Federalist Papers No. 10; one that remains highly relatable in contemporary polity; “where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonourable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust, in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47). Madison’s theory continues, “[h]ence it clearly appears, that the same advantage, which a republic has over a democracy, in controling [sic] the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic . . . is enjoyed by the union over the states composing it. Does this advantage consist in the substitution of representatives, whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice?” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47).

Madison contended that above all, Publius’s 85 ideas for a national concentration of power; would be the utopian polis that had ignited the very American Revolution. The Founding Fathers needed to ratify the Constitution in order to actualize their own idyllic dreams of utopia to preclude secession and bolster confidence in the union. As contemporary political philosopher Robert Nozick (1938-2002) writes, “[f]rom no association will I be able to get something worth more to them than what I contribute is worth to them” on the joint pursuit of common interests, Nozick remarks that “none have the right to impose their vision of unity upon the rest,” (Nozick, R., pp. 325, 326). Publius stands in historic defiance to Nozick’s theory, writing that “[i]t will not be denied, that the representation of the union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties, comprised within the union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the union gives it the most palpable advantage,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47). By Constitution, the tyranny of the majority would function as a pretext to normalcy—anyone who disagreed would face the entirety of the federal union—marking the blueprint used by the contemporary deepstate to encroach tyranny into our carefully calculated Constitutional Republic. James Madison held reverence for America’s best interests, yet advocated a system easily exploited and expanded.

James Madison could not conceive of the internet at the time of America’s founding, whereby alternative ideas, facts, and misinformation spread with equal caliber like wildfire. Madison felt that factious leaders would be unable to create national resistance as it would require the disunion of states, writing that “[t]he influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states: a religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national councils against any danger from that source,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47). James Madison pinpointed the sources of factious leaders, writing of those with “a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project,” asserting that the claimed violator “will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union, than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire state;” Madison clarifying that “[i]n the extent and proper structure of the union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government,” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 47).    

Conclusion

James Madison’s Federalist Paper No. 10 concludes with further promise of a nationalized Federalist utopia, stating that: “according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit, and supporting the character of federalists,” signing the essay as Publius; (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p., 46). p. 358). Publius represented the acquisition of representation by bureaucracy; they were unelected officials. America’s contemporary national government reveals greater representation of bureaucratic interests, than it does civic representation. The Executive Branch oligarchic oligopoly has hijacked the Founding Father’s delicate network of mixed government; and has since radicalized absolute regimes; while inciting and facilitating the formation of factions and militia to be weaponized against the people. Once multiple curated crises are invoked the national government can update the jurisdiction of the nationalized concentration of power whose interests have become exalted above the people’s. As the encroachment of today’s authoritarian government infringes its way into the private lives of citizenry, alternative regimes are simultaneously deposed; whereby denounced as racist, extremist, and dangerous. Those who fear a diversity in faction may quickly find themselves at the behest of despotism, under an absolute regime; lest objectivity preclude the abdication of sovereignty—sustaining liberty for posterity. Reiterating the reflective words of Federalist James Madison and Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry; “[l]iberty is to faction what air is to fire, an ailment without which it instantly expires…“[g]ive me liberty or give me death!” (Madison, J.; McClellan, J., p. 358; Henry, P.; Elson, J., p. 126).

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