Case Brief: In re S.M., 416 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)

In re S.M., 416 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)

Statement of Facts

The respondent is The respondent planned to hunt raccoons, therefore was carrying a gun. Four boys did a U-turn in the school parking lot. According to some witnesses the vehicle was heading toward the respondent. Some witnesses attested that the four boys’ vehicle would not have hit the respondent. The respondent yelled an obscenity at the driver, causing him to stop and exit the vehicle. The driver, Michael Gale pursued the respondent. The respondent revealed he bore a gun, in an attempt to stop the conflict before it escalated. Gale perceived this as a threat, and alerted his friends that the respondent had a gun. This event led to three additional individuals joining Gale in his pursuit of the respondent. The four boys had specific factors contributory to the respondent’s fear for his life. The four boys were older, athletic, and drunk. The respondent was cornered and lapidated; under these circumstances, the respondent exercised self-restraint. Furthermore, the respondent exercised a duty to retreat. Outnumbered 4–1 the respondent fired a warning shot—this did not deter the four advancing boys. The minor respondent shot and killed two boys, wounding two others. These shots were fired in rapid succession, neglecting any intermittent cessation whatsoever.

Procedural History

The trial court charged the respondent with the murder of two individuals, aggravated battery, and the unlawful use of a weapon. The trial court adjudged delinquent for the commission of (1) two counts of voluntary manslaughter; and (2) two counts of aggravated battery. This adjudgment occurred contrary to the extensive evidence. The respondent admitted to the unlawful use of a weapon prior to conviction. The respondent did not admit a premeditated intent to kill. Therefore, the respondent’s actions were a direct result of his circumstances and subjective state of fear. The respondent’s level of fear cannot be quantified; therefore it must be based on his reactions. The respondent reacted in self-defense, as clearly indicated by his consistent firing. The respondent was committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections.

The respondent appealed two contentions post-sentencing. First, the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent was not acting in self-defense. Second, the trial court acted against the weight of evidence, including multiple testimonies.

Issue

The Court reported that “[t]he dispositive issue is whether the state disproved beyond a reasonable doubt the respondents claim of self-defense.” Therefore, the Court only considered whether the respondent acted unreasonably; beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court bears an obligation to reverse a conviction if a substantial doubt is adduced after reviewing the evidence, People v. Lewellen (1969), 43 I11. 2d 74, 250 N.E.2d 651; People v. Goodman (1979), 77 I11. App. 3d 569, 369_N.E.2d_274.

Moreover, the Court sought to investigate the respondent’s claim of self-defense. The Court ought to have considered Carter v. Commonwealth; whereby the Supreme Court held that “[i]f to him they indicate an attack, he is justified in resorting to defensive action.” Carter v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 681, 688 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).

This issue is supported by (Allen v. United States) whereby the Supreme Court held it was “erroneous” that “the intentional arming himself with a pistol by the defendant, even if with a view to self-defense, would make a case of murder unless the actual affray developed a case of necessary self-defense.” Allen v. United States (1895) 157 U.S. 675.

Rule of Law

The respondent possessed the legal right to defend himself. The Court asserted that, “one who is deliberately assaulted…has the right, under the law, to deliberately kill his assailant,” People v. Motuzas (1933), 352_I11._340, 346, 185_N.E._614, 617.

The respondent’s believed there existed an imminent danger. Under these circumstances, the respondent was not expected to possess clear judgment during the attack, (People v. Shipp (1977) 52 I11. App. 3d 470, 367_N.E.2d_966); (People v. Bailey (1975),27 I11. App. 3d 128, 326 N.E.2d 550 (/opinion/2096378/people-v-bailey/).)

It must be shown how the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the respondent’s claim of self-defense. Self-defense is contingent on both the assessment of circumstances and facts, People v. Woods (1980), 81 I11. 2d537, 410 N.E.2d 866, People v. Shipp (1977).

The respondent fired four shots in rapid succession. Illinois notes under Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 7-1 that “[a] person is justified in the use of deadly force when the person ‘reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself.” Terence F. MacCarthy, Criminal Law, Loyola University Chicago Law Journal (Winter 1988 https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1808&context=luclj).

Similarly, People v. Lockett convicted the respondent of voluntary manslaughter; thus a response to subjective belief was acted upon. (People v. Lockett (1980), 82_I11. 2d_546, 413_N.E.2d_378.)

The Court presented the evidence most favorable to the State, to determine whether the respondent was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Price (1979), 79 I11. App 3d 1112, 398 N.E.2d 1158; People v. Lynch (1976), 43 I11. App 3d 1039, 358_N.E.2d_17.) This included first-hand witness testimony; advocation of moral character; and a rational legal basis for self-defense.

Holding

The Court held that (1) “while the initial use of force was justified, the claim of self-defense will not necessarily be negated.” The Court thence cited “the fact that several shots were [sequentially] fired.” The Court added a disjunction; “or that the last shot was fired after the attack was over.” In either light, the self-defense remained a clear explanation for the actions of the respondent.

Moreover, the Court held that “[t]he evidence even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, shows that the respondent tried to avoid a confrontation.” (People v. Price; People v. Lynch.)

Rationale

The Court’s rationale appealed to the State’s evidence, and the lack of certainty. The respondent (1) apologized for swearing; (2) retreated promptly; (3) made repetitive efforts to flee  (4) declared that he possessed the weapon (5) brandished the firearm to deter the assailants; (5) gave a warning shot; and (6) conservatively fired four shots (7) successfully stopped the attack.

The trial Court committed a logical fallacy in their ruling; in this case, the fallacy of dicto simpliciter precluded the respondent’s justice. This sweeping generalization led to the omission of the evidential specificities required to make this case unique. A second glance at the State’s evidence and witness testimony reveals the ruling’s fallacious effects.

Moreover, this initial fallacy led to further illogical actions. The trial court committed argumentum ad ignorantiam whereby the court’s lack of knowledge—or unwillingness to observe the evidence—led to the wrongful incarceration of the respondent.

The evidence was given in witness testimonies. Its origin was rooted in (1) the evasion of the respondent after the initial assault; (2) the pursuit by and comparative characteristics of the four boys; (3) the brandishing of firearms to preclude violence; (4) the firing of shots in rapid succession; and (5) the respondent’s lawful cooperation with authorities on the matter.

The Court acknowledged the four boys posed an imminent threat. Specifically, (1) the four boys had been drinking; (2) the four boys were older; (3) the four boys were athletes; (4) the four boys initiated the physical assault; (5) the respondent was outnumbered 4–1. The Court’s rationale stated that “[u]nder these circumstances, we cannot say that the respondent’s belief that he was in immediate danger of death or great bodily harm was unreasonable.”

Jesus Christ, decreed that we are to “[s]tay dressed for action and keep your lamps burning, and be like men who are waiting for their master to come home from the wedding feast, so that they may open the door to him at once when he comes and knocks.” Luke 12:35-36 (ESV). On the immediacy of the trial court’s hasty adjudgment of the respondent; we are reminded by the Lord “[j]udge not, that you be not judged. For with the judgment you pronounce you will be judged, and with the measure you use it will be measured to you.” Matthew 7:1-2 (ESV). Moreover, it is written we must “[s]peak up for those who have no voice, for the justice of all who are dispossessed. Speak up, judge righteously, and defend the cause of the oppressed and needy.” Proverbs 31:8-9 (CSB).

Judgment

The Court’s judgment reversed and remanded the respondent. The Court decreed three actions in its judgment. First, it dismissed the judgment of the circuit court. Second, the Court vacated the dispositional order from the trial court. This reversed the respondent’s sentence to the Illinois Department of Corrections. Third, the Court remanded the respondent for dispositional hearing on the judgment of delinquency for the unlawful use of a weapon. This means the respondent’s actions were not recognized by the Court as murder; as he acted in self-defense.